piBlawg

the personal injury and clinical negligence blog

A collaboration between Rebmark Legal Solutions and 1 Chancery Lane

Personal responsibility, unfortunate accidents and the liability of occupiers

Criminal lawyers are often asked how they can bring themselves to defend people who they know are guilty.  Actually, I am asked that not infrequently too...  But the more common dinner party accusation aimed at civil common law lawyers is: "Pft!  Nanny state!  People can sue for anything nowadays!  Don't people have to take some responsibility for themselves?"  I have two responses to this.  My usual one is to disappear behind my glass of wine before changing the subject.  The other is to say that yes, people bring some ridiculous claims, but it doesn't necessarily mean they win.  The newspaper reading nation has been shocked by publicity about some of the claims brought by police officers injured in the course of their duties that have been pursued.  I don't know any lawyers in our line of business who have.  One has the impression that the Court of Appeal were perhaps a little vexed by the case of Tacagni v Cornwall County Council and ors.  Judgment was handed down yesterday.  Ms Tacagni sued various parties.  Her claim was dealt with under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957.  After consuming eight drinks over a "long" evening Ms Tacagni was walking home in the dark with her partner.  They had no torch and she was wearing uncomfortable shoes.  The pair walked along a raised pathway that ran approximately two metres above and alongside a road until they decided that it was too dark and turned back.  Ms Tacagni's partner left her to go and call a taxi.  Ms Tacagni set off on her own, using a fence to guide her along the path. Following the line of the fence Ms Tacagni left the path, crossed 4.8 metres of grass and fell off the edge of the raised section onto the road below. The fence had been erected around an area of the pathway's retaining wall which had collapsed in 2001. The Court at first instance heard some evidence from the Defendant about concerns one of its employees had had about whether the fence was sufficient to protect cyclists and children.  The judge was obviously swayed by this criticism and found for the claimant, with a two thirds deduction for contributory negligence.  The Court of Appeal allowed the local authority's appeal and dismissed Ms Tacagni's claim.  Their lordships concluded that the evidence as a whole did not warrant the judge's finding that the local authority had unreasonably failed to guard against the risk of accident that in fact befell Ms Tacagni. It was hard to envisage that a person would be using the fence as a guide and that it would not have been obvious to them that they were departing from the path and crossing a significant portion of the grass. Accordingly, the evidence did not warrant the conclusion that the local authority had breached its common duty of care.  The judge had left out a material factor in his evaluation: the degree of care that was to be expected of an ordinary visitor under s.2(3) of the Act. So next time you find yourself at a dinner party being harangued about the state of the law and the fact that people are not expected to take care for themselves you can disappear behind your glass of wine secure in the knowledge that, for the purposes of the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 at least, from time to time the courts conclude that yes they do.   Image: © Bellemedia | <a href="http://www.dreamstime.com/">Dreamstime Stock Photos</a> & <a href="http://www.stockfreeimages.com/">Stock Free Images</a>  

"In Loco Parentis": the liability of schools when disaster strikes

Summer school trips were one of the high points of the year when I was a child. I don't think anyone wholly forgets the bubbling anticipation that comes with the prospect of a totally brilliant trip.  Some were better than others.  An adventure weekend to Windermere where we jumped out of canoes and walked rope bridges was amazing.  The day trip to Martin Mere Wetland Centre was less good.  We sat on the coach for an extra two hours because the driver got lost.  It rained.  I can barely express the excitement that accompanied the school Centenary special trip to Alton Towers.  School trip season is approaching again now that the summer term has begun and, as usual, I reflect on the current state of the law.  It distresses me when it is said that the law is making it impossible for schools to give the next generation the same opportunities we had.  Organising, planning and supervising trips is an intimidating task.  Whilst the law rightly expects schools to take their obligations seriously - planning trips with care - media hype about the perils of litigation is perhaps overstated.  As the Court of Appeal has demonstrated once again, even the most tragic of cases will not necessarily succeed if the school has done its job properly and the claimant cannot show that any errors that might be identified would have made any difference.  Judgment was handed down last Friday in Wilkin-Shaw (Administratrix of the Estate of Charlotte Shaw (Deceased)) v (1) Christopher Fuller; (2) Kingsley School Bideford Trustee Co Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 410. On 4 March 2007 Charlotte Shaw was 14 years old and participating in a training event for the Ten Tors challenge as part of a team from her school.  The team had completed one day of the training weekend. On the second day their supervising teacher decided that they had proved themselves under supervision and that it was appropriate for the team to progress to remote supervision and carry out a planned walk unaccompanied, checking in at pre arranged points with teachers.  The group successfully completed the second leg of the day's planned journey and arrived at a check point about an hour earlier than expected.  The teachers who they expected to meet were not there.  The supervising teacher spoke to the leader of the group (a pupil) on the telephone and told them to wait.  It transpired that the two members of staff who were supposed to meet them had lost their way and missed the checkpoint. When the teachers contacted the supervising teacher they were told to return to their car. The supervising teacher then received a telephone call from a scoutmaster (T) who had encountered the children waiting at the checkpoint. He told the supervising teacher that the group was starting to get cold and should continue walking. The direct route to the next check point led across the Walla Brook, which was swollen with rain water and uncrossable at that point. The supervising teacher spoke again to the group by telephone and told them to start walking but not to cross Walla Brook but to go round its head.  After the children had started out on the next leg T became involved again and offered to show the group where he had crossed Walla Brook earlier. While attempting to cross, with T's assistance, Charlotte fell in.  She was swept away by the strong current and drowned.  At trial the case was against the school alleging vicarious liability for the supervising teacher's negligence.  That claim was dismissed. Last Friday the Court of Appeal gave judgment on the appeal.  The case on appeal was rather different than at first instance but the Court allowed it to be pursued.  It was argued on behalf of Charlotte's mother that the teacher who should have been present at the checkpoint to meet the children was negligent in getting lost and that had she been present the children would not have followed the advice of T, the scout master they met while waiting at the checkpoint. The Court of Appeal found that the teacher had been negligent, but concluded that it was highly speculative to consider what would have happened had she been at the checkpoint.  The Court considered the duties of a checkpointer and considered that she may well have checked the fitness of the children then sent them on their way, so that she would not have been present on their return when they met T.  Even had she remained at the checkpoint the intervention of T would have broken the chain of causation. Whilst it would be wrong to suggest that anyone should take cheer from a tragic case of this sort, schools should take comfort from the care and rigor with which this case was considered at both first instance and on appeal. I hope that the legacy of this case is to emphasise that exciting trips should be planned properly and carefully, with appropriate training and supervision, but happen they should. 

Cockbill v Riley: Youthful exuberance and the test of foreseeability

I turned 29 this week. As I reminisced about the days when hangovers were a mild inconvenience to be overcome within a matter of hours, my attention was drawn to a recent case arising out of an end-of-GCSE party, a paddling pool and an attempted bellyflop that went tragically wrong. On 20 July 2006, Ryan Cockbill went to a barbeque organised by a friend – Sarah Riley, armed with a 12 pack of Budweiser beer and 12 bottles of Vodka Kick. When he arrived, he saw that two paddling pools had been set up in the back garden at Sarah’s house; photographs taken at the time show that the larger pool came up to adult waist-height. The party was in full-swing, with a number of teenagers becoming boisterous but not behaving drunkenly. Sarah’s father decided it was time to serve up food and line a few young stomachs. Ryan had not taken swimming trunks with him but was offered a pair by a friend. Whilst everyone was eating, he changed into them in an upstairs bathroom. When he came back down to the garden, he said “watch me go” and went across to the pool intending to do a bellyflop. He doesn’t remember what happened after that. It appears that Ryan entered the paddling pool head first, which caused him to fracture his spine, rendering him tetraplegic. A claim was issued against Mr Riley, Sarah’s father, claiming that he had been negligent in, among other ways, not intervening earlier and more forcefully when six or seven boys were running and jumping into the pool. On 22 March, dismissing the claim, Mr Justice Bean held that it was reasonably foreseeable that someone would lose his footing and suffer minor injury. However, even after a number of boys had jumped into the pool feet first, it was not reasonably foreseeable that someone would attempt to carry out a dive or a belly-flop and thus suffer grave injury ([2013] EWHC 656 (QB) at [56]). This treatment of foreseeability is interesting. It could be argued that the accident, framed in more general terms was foreseeable – that teenagers would mess around in the pool at the risk of some personal injury – for example. Since the House of Lords decision in Hughes v Lord Advocate ([1963] 2 W.L.R. 779) the Courts have been encouraged to take a broad approach to the categorisation of damage. Therefore, whilst I agree with Mr Justice Bean’s conclusions as to breach of duty, he has defined the foreseeable risks in this case too narrowly, in my view.  

Shut out: The UK Supreme Court’s first "secret hearing"

Bank Mellat v HM Treasury UKSC 2011/0040     The Supreme Court held a hearing in secret today, for the first time in its history.   According to the BBC, the justices spent 45 minutes in a locked session with a security guard stood outside the door to prevent anyone from entering. The hearing was so sensitive that the justices had to leave one courtroom and set up in another which had greater soundproofing.   The hearing arises out of the Treasury’s decision in 2010 to ban an Iranian bank from operating in the UK, using powers under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. The government alleged that the bank had been indirectly involved in financing companies linked to the Iranian nuclear programme.   At first instance, Mr Justice Mitting permitted some of the government’s evidence to be adduced behind closed doors on grounds that it contained sensitive material that may compromise national security. The first instance judgment was therefore produced in two drafts, with only the redacted version being made available to the public.   A nine-strong panel decided that the court did have jurisdiction to consider the closed judgment, but would only do so if persuaded (on the basis of submissions in open court) that it was necessary for the purpose of fairly disposing of the appeal. At that stage the court was not so persuaded. Lord Hope described the government’s refusal to spell out even its basic national security case in open court as ‘cloak and dagger stuff’ that was ‘difficult to swallow’.   The court was reluctantly persuaded this morning that it was indeed necessary to consider the closed judgment and that this would necessitate a closed hearing. According to Lord Neuberger ‘unless and until an appellate court sees the judgment, it often cannot be sure its contents will be irrelevant or that its contents have been fully gisted’. He went on ‘no doubt in due course when we have completed the closed hearing...we will have quite a few things to say about this unhappy procedure.’   The court clearly has it in mind to use this episode to issue guidance to other courts faced with similar requests for a closed hearing. But whatever tests and safeguards are laid down, the use of secret courts is bound to become more widespread with the passage of the Justice and Security Bill.   Where litigants are prevented from seeing the State's evidence against them, hearing its submissions on that evidence, or understanding what part that evidence played in their claim being dismissed, the balance of justice is dangerously skewed. And far from being immune to these changes, PI litigation, employers’ liability in particular (for instance, claims by wounded servicemen against the MoD) may yet become the area of law most acutely affected.

Is dissatisfaction with bedroom performance a 'recognisable psychiatric illness'?

The Times reports today that ‘millions of people risk being labelled as mentally ill under new classifications which have prompted calls for a boycott by psychologists (The Times, March 20 2013). The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is due out in May and it is reported that dozens of new conditions have been created. Thus there is a Generalised Anxiety Disorder which includes everyday worries, a Minor Neurocognitive Disorder for forgetfulness in old age and Behavioural Addictions which, the report says, turn much of what people enjoy doing into a disorder. Professor Peter Kinderman who is the head of the Institute of Psychology, Health and Society at the University of Liverpool said that his favourite is the Female Orgasmic Disorder which is the temerity to complain about your husband’s ability to perform in bed. The Times goes on to say that a group of psychologists will launch a campaign today to boycott the new manual. In Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 the House of Lords made it clear that one of the control mechanisms in claims for damages for what used to be called ‘nervous shock’ was that they were only recoverable for a recognisable psychiatric illness. This control mechanism assumed that there was some agreement among psychiatrists as to what ‘recognisable psychiatric illnesses’ were. That consensus seems to be coming undone. It will be interesting to see whether some of the more controversial conditions and disorders will be pruned from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual following a consultation period and prior to publication. (Image courtesy of Mr Lightman/FreeDigitalPhotos.net)

After pasties and caravans … CFAs and DBAs?

Is it just me or should we all be concerned about the way in which the legislation to implement Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations is being introduced?   Why have there been so few announcements about what are, after all, radical and far reaching public policy changes? If we as legal professionals are unsure about the proposed changes, how can we properly advise the public after 1 April 2013?   Will legal professionals soon be joining bakers and caravanning enthusiasts in pointing out to the government the potential far reaching consequences of over hasty legislation?   In the foreword to his final report on costs in civil litigation dated 21 December 2009 Lord Justice Jackson wrote:   “ … I therefore propose a coherent package of interlocking reforms, designed to control costs and promote access to justice ...”   He went on to make a total of 109 separate recommendations some but not all of which have found their way into proposed new legislation. In particular the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2013 (the CFA Order) and the Damages-based Agreements Regulations 2013 (the DBA Regulations) have now been laid before Parliament and were subject to a Motion to Approve debate in the House of Lords on 26 February 2013.   Both have been described by the General Council for the Bar (GCB) as “not fit for purpose”. The GCB also suggested that the proposed order and regulations “will deny access to justice, burden the courts’ time with unnecessary satellite litigation and limit the commercial use of DBAs”.    There are certainly grounds for concern. As we all know, the success fee under a CFA entered into after 1 April 2013 for proceedings at first instance will be capped at 25%. Article 5(2) of the proposed CFA Order provides that this will be 25% of “(a) general damages for pain, suffering, and loss of amenity; and (b) damages for pecuniary loss, other than future pecuniary loss” (my emphasis). However, in a lecture given on 29 February 2012, Lord Justice Jackson amended his view in response to submissions from a number of parties and proposed that the cap should be 25% of all damages. There must be a risk that in larger and more complicated cases which are difficult to cost budget and involve significant initial disbursements, limiting the cap to 25% of past losses will not promote “access to justice” as Lord Justice Jackson hoped but may in fact prove to be a disincentive to  taking on such cases in the first place.   Then there is VAT. As drafted, the proposed CFA Order provides that the “damages” to which the 25% cap applies are “net of any sums recoverable by the Compensation Recovery Unit of the Department for Work and Pensions”. There is no exclusion for VAT. But if VAT is included in such damages there is not only scope for uncertainty (what happens, for example, if the VAT rate changes after the CFA has been entered into but before a bill of costs is rendered?) but in the larger and more complicated cases this may be a further reason why those contemplating taking on such cases may decline to do so on the grounds that the unpredictability of the risk will not be properly compensated by the level of the CFA.   The same objections apply to the proposed DBA Regulations. As presently drafted, the cap for DBAs is inclusive of VAT but exclusive of damages for future pecuniary loss. In addition, the DBA Regulations do not allow for “hybrid” agreements i.e. agreements under which some costs are recoverable if a “win” does not occur rather than no costs at all. This is again contrary to what Lord Justice Jackson recommended and may prove a disincentive to the use of DBAs particularly in commercial cases.   Access to justice may not be as newsworthy as Cornish pasties and static caravans but in resource-intensive cases, the government’s aim of protecting the damages recoverable by claimants may actually result in some claimants being unable to obtain legal representation and thus recovering no damages at all.       Image – cornishpasties.com

CFAs prior to 1st April 2013 - will the old or new rules apply?

What do you have to do to ensure that Parts 43 to 48 of the existing rules continue to apply to CFAs entered into before 1st April 2013? Do advocacy or litigation services have to be provided before 1st April 2013 or not? For the existing rules to continue to apply to CFAs entered into before 1st April 2013 what needs to be done prior to 1st April 2013 will depend on whether you are acting under a Conditional Fee Agreement or a Collective Conditional Fee Agreement (those are the two funding arrangements defined by rule 43.2(1)(k)(i) of the existing rules). If you enter into a Conditional Fee Agreement prior to 1st April 2013 specifically for the purposes of provision of advocacy or litigation services to a person in relation to the matter which is the subject of proceedings then the new rules (CPR r.48.2(1)(a)(i)(aa)) state that the old Parts 43 to 48 will apply (with modifications about which we are yet to hear). There does not appear to be any suggestion that advocacy or litigation services actually need to be provided prior to 1st April 2013. The story is different if you have a Collective Conditional Fee Agreement. In that case the new rules seem to state that, for the old rules to apply, you have to have provided advocacy or litigation services to the person by whom the success fee is payable prior to 1st April 2013. The drafters of the rules could have made it a lot easier to understand what they were getting at by actually referring to CFAs in r.48.2(1)(a)(i)(aa) and CCFAs in r.48.2(1)(a)(i)(bb). A bit more clarity is provided by the explanatory note to Article 6 of the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2013 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2013/9780111533437) which states “Article 6 contains a transitional and saving provision. The effect of the transitional provision is to provide that articles 4 and 5 do not apply to a CFA entered into in respect of a claim for personal injuries, or to a collective CFA under which advocacy or litigation services are provided to a person in respect of that claim, before the day on which these regulations comes into force” (i.e. 1st April 2013). That’s my take on the current rules which are still being finalised. I ought to add, in the time-honoured fashion, that this does not constitute legal advice and liability for any reliance placed on it is disclaimed…

Claimant’s solicitors pay wasted costs in RTA case

  The defendant insurers in the case of Rasoul v Linkevicius (5th October 2012, Unreported), successfully obtained a wasted costs order against claimant solicitors in an RTA claim. The case is a warning to claimant solicitors in RTA claims where there is an allegation of fraud and parties/witnesses who do not speak English. For defendants it is a lesson in how clear allegations set out from early on can have devastating consequences.  The background facts are similar to those commonly encountered in practice. Following the RTA correspondence ensued between the claimant’s solicitors and the defendant insurers. A modest PI claim was made and the insurers questioned the bona fides of the claim. The Defence pleaded fraud clearly against the claimant. He served a witness statement which did not have an integral statement of truth – the statement appeared on a separate sheet of paper rather than being part of the body of the statement itself. Two witnesses provided statements with statements of truth. At trial the claimant gave no evidence as only spoke Kurdish and was illiterate. His statement had been in English and not translated. The husband and wife witnesses were Kurdish. The husband spoke reasonable English but had given his statement over the phone to a solicitor he had not met and at trial he said that his statement was a substantial expansion of what he told the solicitor. The other witness (his wife) spoke no English – her husband translated for her whilst the solicitor took the statement over the phone. She gave evidence that she had never spoken to the solicitor before the statement arrived. Unsurprisingly the case was dismissed and the judge referred to either the extreme incompetence on the part of the solicitors or an attempt to establish a case on fabricated evidence. The insurer made an application for a waste costs order against the solicitors. The judge made an order on the basis that there was no evidence of a proper signed statement from the claimant or the witness taken before proceedings were issued. Although an interpreter turned up at trial he was not allowed to be used as there had been no order relating to his attendance. The judge was critical that the witnesses were not seen face to face by the solicitors given the allegations of fraud. He concluded that proper competent work by the solicitors would have ensured that the case collapsed long before the trial took place. Defendants will be alert to the possibility of pursuing claimant solicitors where fraud has been alleged, there has been incompetence on the part of claimant solicitors which, had it not taken place, would have been likely to have meant the case would not have gone ahead. Claimants will want to see witnesses and take statements face to face where there are allegations of fraud. They must ensure that a proper ‘integral’ statement of truth is signed on the witness statement. If someone is unable to speak English it is essential that a translator is involved in the process of taking the statement, that the statement is translated, the translator makes an appropriate statement (see Practice Direction to Part 32) and the presence of a translator at trial is anticipated by a court order. Careful preparation needs to be undertaken so that solicitors can protect themselves by showing that a witness did give the evidence set out in the statement – even if they deny it at trial and seek to blame it on the solicitors.  

20% CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE FOR MOONING

Monday passed (21 January) is officially recognised as the most depressing day in the year. And so, it was something of a distraction to the surrounding doom and gloom to read Swift J most recent judgment in the personal injury case of Ayres v Odedra [2012] EWHC 40 (QB). Those of you who read this blog regularly will know that Swift J’s decisions have been the subject of a number of postings.   Here are the facts. C had brought proceedings, via his Mother and litigation friend, after having been involved in a road traffic accident with D. C had been out drinking heavily with his friends, and as the evening progressed the more inebriated he became. C and friends found themselves in the city centre walking or perhaps more accurately stumbling their way towards a club. Being boisterous young people they were in the mood for ‘larking about’. In C’s case, he decided to stand in the middle of the road in front of D’s car and proceed to moon. For those of you unfamiliar with the expression Wikipedia offers a very helpful definition: “the act of displaying one's bare buttocks by removing clothing, e.g., by lowering the backside of one's trousers and underpants, usually bending over, whether also exposing the genitals or not.” D attempted to drive around C, yet somehow C ended up getting run over. At trial there was a dispute over whether C fell by reason of being drunk or that he had been inadvertently struck by D. The finding was that D had misjudged the timing of C’s actions; he was on notice of C’s condition not least because of his disinhibition and ought to have given him a wider berth. On the question of contributory negligence, C was found to have contributed to his injuries by being inebriated and mooning but the reduction was a modest 20%. The act of mooning is criminal offence in many countries, attracting sentences ranging from imprisonment through to corporal punishment. In this country it could constitute an offence of disorderly conduct or indecent exposure. However, more often than not the ‘mooner’ will get away with a warning by the police officer not to do it again. What is interesting, in this case, is that such disorderly conduct resulted in a low level of deduction. The two overriding factors that courts consider in respect of contributory negligence are the causative potency of a Claimant's act/omission and its moral blameworthiness to the injury in question. On any given view the Claimant scored highly on both fronts. Does this mean our courts are adopting a soft approach to such conduct?    

“Safe sex” – Part 2

Regular readers will recall the story so far in relation to this unfortunate “on the job” injury which raises important questions about activities which can properly be said to arise out of or occur in the course of employment.    The appellant, a female public servant, sued the Australian federal government after being injured while having sex on a work trip in a motel bedroom. A glass light fitting came away from the wall above the bed as she was having sex striking her in the face and causing injuries to her nose, mouth and a tooth as well as “a consequent psychiatric injury” described as an adjustment disorder.   The appellant’s partner’s evidence was that they were “going hard” and that he did not know “if we bumped the light or it just fell off”.  He added, not unreasonably, that he was “not paying attention because we were rolling around”.   The appellant claimed compensation because her injuries were caused “during the course of her employment” as she had been instructed to travel to and spend the night in the motel in a small town in New South Wales ahead of a departmental meeting early the next day.   The respondent, Comcare, the Australian government's workplace safety body, rejected the claim on the grounds that sexual activity “was not an ordinary incident of an overnight stay like showering, sleeping or eating”. That decision was upheld by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.   However, on appeal to the Federal Court of Australia (FCA), the appellant’s counsel submitted that the accident was in truth “no different than slipping over in the shower”. In addition, “lawful sexual activity” should now be considered reasonable behaviour in a hotel room by an employee as “it's not the 1920s”.   Counsel for ComCare responded that people need to eat, sleep and attend to their personal hygiene but “you don't need to have sex”.   The judge, Nicholas J., allowed the appellant’s appeal - see PVYW v Comcare (No 2) [2012] FCA 395. The judge held that “While it is true that in determining whether an injury occurred in the course of employment, regard must always be had to the general nature, terms and circumstances of the applicant’s employment, there was nothing of that description in the present case which could justify a finding that the interval or interlude was interrupted by the applicant’s lawful sexual activity” – see [54] of the judgment.   Comcare appealed to the full court of the FCA which on 13 December 2012 dismissed its appeal – see Comcare v PVYW [2012] FCAFC 181.   In a carefully reasoned judgment the full court, presided over by Keane CJ., rejected Comcare’s essential submission that “an injured employee who claims to have been injured during an interval or interlude between periods of actual work must show both that the injury occurred at a place he or she was induced or encouraged by the employer to be and that the activity from which the injury arose was induced or encouraged by the employer, or was implicitly accepted”.   The court held that that the potential conditions for liability were not conjunctive in the sense that an activity test should be super-imposed on a place test. There was no combined or two-stage test. There was a single test which may be satisfied in either one of two ways. Further, the concept of, here, “a frolic of her own” was one which applies to wrongful acts. The court also made clear that “the views of the respondent’s employer about the respondent’s (lawful) activities were irrelevant, whether or not those views (if sought) may have reflected disapproval or indifference” – see [50] – [55] of the judgment.   This must be right. Why should being injured whilst having sex be any different to the claimant being injured whilst working out on one of the exercise bicycles or cross trainers in the motel’s gym provided that the injury occurred within an overall period or episode of work and negligence can be shown. Further, why should the employer approve when and how an employee has sex any more than where she chooses to have her breakfast?   Comcare is considering an appeal to the High Court, Australia's highest legal tribunal. In the meantime, common sense has prevailed, the judgment provides useful guidance on the scope of workplace injuries and I, for one, will in future double check the structural integrity of motel light fittings.