piBlawg

the personal injury and clinical negligence blog

A collaboration between Rebmark Legal Solutions and 1 Chancery Lane

Getting your hands on an undisclosed expert report and more

09 September 2016 Ian-Miller case report, Experts, personal injury, Privilege, cpr (0)
When the other side wants to change expert are you entitled to their original expert’s reports and other documentation containing the substance of the expert’s opinion? This was the question considered in the case Allen Tod Architecture v Capita Property and Infrastructure Ltd ([2016] EWHC 2171). Unsurprisingly the claimant in that case resisted disclosure on the grounds that the documents and reports sought were privileged. The claimant had grown exasperated by his expert’s delays and shortcomings and so turned to an alternative expert. At paragraph 32 of his judgment the judge set out the authorities and principles to be applied when considering whether to grant permission to a party to change expert:  (1) The court has a wide and general power to exercise its discretion whether to impose terms when granting permission to a party to adduce expert opinion evidence (2) In exercising that power or discretion, the court may give permission for a party to rely on a second replacement expert, but such power or discretion is usually exercised on condition that the report of the first expert is disclosed (and privilege waived - see Vasiliou v Hajigeorgiou [2005] 1 WLR 2195) (3)  Once the parties have engaged in a relevant pre-action protocol process, and an expert has prepared a report in the context of such process, that expert then owes a duty to the Court irrespective of his instruction by one of the parties, and accordingly there was no justification for not disclosing that report as a condition for changing expert (see  Edwards-Tubb v JD Wetherspoon plc [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1373 – a PI case)  (4) The court's power to exercise its discretion whether to impose terms when giving permission to a party to adduce expert opinion evidence arises irrespective of the occurrence of any ‘expert shopping’. It is a power to be exercised reasonably on a case-by-case basis, in each case having regard to all the circumstances of that particular case.   (5) The court will require strong evidence of ‘expert shopping’ before imposing a term that a party discloses other forms of document than the report of expert A (such as attendance notes and memoranda made by a party's solicitor of his or her discussions with expert A) as a condition of giving permission to rely on expert B (see (BMG (Mansfield) Ltd v Galliford Try Construction Ltd  [2013] EWHC 3183)  In the case of Allen Tod itself the judge found that there was no real reason for making a distinction between the expert’s final report, draft or provisional reports or other documents setting out his opinion: neither would have been discloseable if the expert had remained the claimant’s expert. He ordered disclosure of the original expert’s notes and preliminary report as a condition of permitting the claimant to rely on the new expert and he also ordered disclosure of any document in which the original expert had provided his opinion. To the extent any other material was contained in any such document, it was to be redacted before disclosure.

Inadequate bundles: a costly mistake...

15 August 2016 Ian-Miller case report, costs, cpr (0)
The July edition of Civil Procedure News reports a case in which a claimant's bundles were inadequate, two applications were adjourned and the claimant was ordered to pay the costs of producing properly prepared bundles and the costs thrown away as a result of the adjournment. The claimant had brought three applications for summary judgment on three separate claims. Two of the applications were supported by a witness statement which had 750 pages of exhibits. The judge criticised the lack of pagination and the fact that many of the exhibits were not placed in the bundle where they were stated to be in the witness statements. The inadequate pagination meant that the time-estimate for pre-reading and the hearing was inadequate. The judge found there had been a breach of the Overriding Objective (managing the courts resources proportionately). PM Project Services Limited v Dairy Crest Ltd [2016] EWHC 1235 is a sobering reminder of the potential consequences of poorly-prepared bundles. This decision comes hot on the heals of a decision earlier this year by the Court of Appeal. The editor of the Civil Procedure News draws attention to the decision in Pawar v JSD Haulage Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 551 in which the Court of Appeal granted the respondent its costs of having to prepare appeal bundles as those submitted by the appellant were described as "chaotic".

Trial by ambush?

31 May 2016 Ella-Davis case report, cpr, evidence, procedure (0)
In Hayden v Maidstone & Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust [2016] EWHC 1121 (QB) Foskett J, albeit with “considerable misgiving”, allowed a Defendant to rely on surveillance footage that had been disclosed so late that it caused the trial date to be vacated. The decision is not so much of interest because of its outcome but for the judge’s more general comments on the issue of when surveillance evidence might properly be served. Facts It was held that from May 2015, when their pain management expert expressed the view that it was possible the Claimant was “grossly exaggerating for the purposes of financial gain”, the Defendant had every reason to commission surveillance evidence. Its failure to do so until January 2016 was unexplained and unreasonable. A series of lengthy but less culpable delays thereafter meant that the edited surveillance was finally served by post on 24 March, Maundy Thursday and received on Tuesday 30 March. The Defendant’s application to rely on it came before Foskett J on 8 April who decided that the Claimant should have time to consider her position and that therefore the trial due to commence in the week beginning 11 April had to be vacated. When it came back before him later that month he considered the events leading to that outcome and decided that the interests of justice required the evidence to be admitted. However, he declined to reserve costs to the trial judge holding that this was the “clearest possible case in which the order should be that the Defendant should bear the costs thrown away by the vacation of the trial date on the indemnity basis”. The Defendant was also ordered to pay the costs of the Claimant’s experts considering the surveillance, again on the indemnity basis Points of General Application  In reaching this decision Foskett J made a number of useful observations on the approach that parties and the court should take to surveillance evidence. Lawyers on both sides would be well advised to take those points on board, particularly Defendant representatives considering when to disclose footage. At paragraph 1 the judge explained that he was giving the Claimant time to consider whether she in fact wanted to oppose the application on the basis that this type of application can backfire on Defendants and represent a bonus to Claimants. It’s easy to see how unconvincing footage, presumably the high water mark of a Defendant’s case, might lend weight to a Claimant’s case. At paragraph 31, in the course of reviewing the authorities, he reiterated that the question of whether or not there is an ambush does not require a sinister motive to be shown but asks only whether the behaviour is otherwise culpable. Thus a Defendant does not have to be shown to be acting in bad faith or sharply – what matters is the effect of the conduct on the Claimant’s ability to deal with the evidence fairly. The judge observed at paragraph 34 that were it necessary to find a deliberate attempt to wrong foot the Claimant then this could only be done fairly in a mini-trial of the solicitor’s conduct. This is the sort of satellite litigation which is to be avoided. Reassuringly for those advising Defendants it is clear from paragraph 36 that his decision is not to be taken as altering the well-recognised position that a Defendant is entitled to wait until a Claimant has nailed his colours to the mast in a witness statement and/or schedule of loss before serving surveillance evidence. Having considered paragraphs 71 and 71 of Judge Collender QC’s decision in Douglas v O’Neill [2011] EWHC 601 (QB) he held that the fact that footage existed and more significantly had been seen by experts was not determinative of the question of whether permission to rely on it should be given. Experts are capable of putting such material out of their minds when giving evidence, just as they know not to reveal matters discussed without prejudice. In this case the judge notes that the Claimant’s solicitors perceived it was inappropriate for the experts to be shown the surveillance footage before permission to rely on it was given but does not really deal with whether they were correct. One can see that if the experts’ knowledge of the footage is, while not determinative, a relevant factor it might be improper to share it with experts and then make the application. Conversely the experts’ opinion might be required to decide whether to make the application. He observed that any inadequacy in the rules dealing with surveillance was a matter for the Civil Procedure Committee but noted that two cases on that issue were heard in the Royal Courts of Justice on the same day. At paragraphs 44 to 46 he questioned whether case management might resolve many such issues. It is the experience of the Senior Master that Claimants often seek an order specifying a date by which surveillance evidence must be served and this is frequently resisted by Defendants. It was suggested that it would be prudent for Claimants to raise the matter with the court as soon as they are in receipt of expert reports which suggest there might be an issue and indeed for the court to raise it of its own motion at the case management stage. Finally, at Paragraph 47, once a Claimant’s case as to the level of disability is clearly articulated and the Defendant has an expert opinion suggesting the claim is “suspect”, an obligation arises actively to obtain surveillance evidence if proportionate. This is not therefore a decision which particularly advances the law but it is a useful insight into how courts will approach applications of this nature.

Cost Budgets – Rule Changes

06 April 2016 Roderick-Abbott costs, cpr, General, legislation (0)
Changes to the CPR coming into force today alter the rules relating to cost budgets. In cases with a stated value of over £50,000 all parties except litigants in person will now exchange budgets 21 days before the first case management conference. Parties must then file an agreed  “budget discussion report” at least 7 days before the first CMC setting out what is agreed, what not agreed, and brief grounds for the latter. The parties are encouraged, but not required, to use a new precedent (“Precedent R”) for the purposes of the budget discussion report. New Rule 3.13 reads:  (1) Unless the court otherwise orders, all parties except litigants in person must file and exchange budgets— (a) where the stated value of the claim on the claim form is less than £50,000, with their directions questionnaires; or (b) in any other case, not later than 21 days before the first case management conference. (2) In the event that a party files and exchanges a budget under paragraph (1), all other parties, not being litigants in person, must file an agreed budget discussion report no later than 7 days before the first case management conference.   Paragraph 6A of Practice Direction 3E now reads: The budget discussion report required by rule 3.13(2) must set out— (a) those figures which are agreed for each phase; (b) those figures which are not agreed for each phase; and (c) a brief summary of the grounds of dispute. The parties are encouraged to use the Precedent R Budget Discussion Report annexed to this Practice Direction.   These changes are to be welcomed. Earlier exchange of budgets before a CMC should ensure that points of dispute are identified earlier and with greater clarity. Having the extent of agreement and disagreement in a single document also makes sense. Previously one often had to refer to points spread across a stream of correspondence. There remain more fundamental problems with cost budgets which are not addressed by these changes. It remains to be seen whether further reform can make the system as a whole operate smoothly and efficiently.

Claims of alleged fraud not exempt from Denton

22 March 2016 Ella-Davis case report, cpr, insurance, Mitchell, procedure, Relief from sanctions, road traffic accidents (0)
“The court cannot ignore that insurers are professional litigants, who can properly be held responsible for any blatant disregard of their own commercial interests.” - Gentry v Miller & Anor [2016] EWCA Civ 141 at 34. Such was the warning sent to insurers by the Court of Appeal earlier this month in allowing a Claimant’s appeal against a decision to set aside default judgment in what the Defendant’s insurer alleged was a fraudulent claim. The Facts The Claimant, Mr Gentry, alleged that he was in a road traffic accident with a Mr Miller on 17th March 2013 in a claims notification form valuing the claim at under £10,000. On 2nd April 2013 Mr Miller’s insurer admitted liability. On 8th April the Claimant’s solicitors wrote requesting immediate payment of the pre-accident value of his car (being £16,000) and warning that until that was received he was hiring a replacement vehicle under a credit hire facility. Proceedings were issued against Mr Miller alone on 3rd July and on 8th August the Claimant obtained default judgement. At no point in this period did the insurer instruct solicitors and it replied to only one of seven letters. In late August the insurer made a voluntary interim payment of £14,000 and a Part 36 Offer of £1,870. A further interim payment of £2,000 was ordered in September and paid. At a disposal hearing on 17th October 2013, DJ Benson awarded the Claimant damages of £75,089 consisting mostly of hire charges. On receipt of notification of this award the insurer instructed solicitors who, on 25th November, issued an application referring to CPR 13.3 (1). On 10th February 2014 those same solicitors applied to come off the record for Mr Miller, to add the insurer as the second defendant and to set aside both the default judgment and the order of 17th October. For the first time they alleged that Mr Gentry and Mr Miller were well known to each other and that the claim was a fraud. The application to set aside was granted by DJ Henthorn on 17th March 2014 and on 4th February 2015 Mr Recorder Gregory (as he then was) dismissed the Claimant’s appeal. The decision of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal considered the applications under CPR 13.3 and 39.3. In relation to the former Vos LJ was satisfied that the Defendant had demonstrated that it had a real prospect of successfully defending the claim but had to consider under CPR 13.3 (2) whether the application was made promptly. The delay to the application of 25th November was inexcusable. In particular Vos LJ noted that the insurer: Failed to adduce any evidence of its postal systems to explain how documents might not have reached it; Must have been aware after admitting liability at the beginning of April 2013 that it was at risk if it did not defend or attempt to settle the claim; Did not instruct solicitors or investigate fraud in the seven months after that admission; Was repeatedly warned of hire charge risks so that the suggestion that it believed the claim to be small and therefore impliedly not worth investigating did not hold water; In ignoring those warnings allowed the claim to grow; While not notified of the default judgment of 8th August as promptly as it might have been, clearly knew that proceedings were on foot when it made a Part 36 offer on 22nd August; Must also have been aware of proceedings when it paid the interim payment ordered by the court; Upon receiving costs schedules on 19th and 23rd September sent “ahead of the upcoming application hearing”, made no enquiry as to what that hearing was about. The court’s analysis then continued by application of the Denton test. It was common ground that Mr Miller’s default in not filing an acknowledgment of service was serious or significant. The fact that it was not served with the proceedings gave the insurer some reasonable excuse or explanation but it could and should have protected itself when it knew proceedings were being issued by appointing solicitors to accept service on behalf of Mr Miller. Finally, looking to all of the circumstances and in particular factors a) and b) it was held that “insurers are in a particularly good position to conduct litigation efficiently and proportionately and to comply with rules and orders”. It cannot avail an insurer who knows the risk from the moment it admits liability to say it was not a party at the time. The application under CPR 39.3 to set aside the order of 17th October, despite the insurer having notice, (although not a copy), of that order since 25th October, was not made until 26th February 2014. It had not been made promptly and therefore, even if the insurer could show it had a good reason for not attending the trial and a reasonable prospect of success, the application could not be granted. Again, it would in any event probably have failed the third stage of the Denton test. Key Lessons There are two key lessons for insurers arising out of this decision. The first is the reminder at the start of this post that insurers will be treated as professional litigants capable of protecting their own interests. The second is that a credible allegation of fraud is not a trump card. When weighing the competing policy interests of the desirability of testing the allegation of fraud against the requirement that there be finality of litigation, the latter at least can outweigh the former. At some point the insurer must be left to bring its own action in relation to the fraud.

Fixed Costs and Part 36 Offers

24 February 2016 Thomas-Crockett costs, cpr, General, LP Costs, LP Part 36, personal injury, procedure (0)
What is the effect of a claimant’s ‘beaten’ Part 36 Offer upon their costs in a low value personal injury case within the RTA or EL/PL Protocol where claimants' costs are fixed pursuant to CPR 45? This has been a vexed question since the introduction of the fixed costs regime , but one the Master of the Rolls giving the sole judgment of the Court of Appeal in Broadhurst & Anor v Tan & Anor [2016] EWCA Civ 94 has now answered with important and far-reaching consequences for litigators in this area. The Court of Appeal held that Parliament and the draftsmen of the amended Rules intended Part 36 offers to have costs consequences in cases where they were bettered at trial even where costs were usually fixed. This means that, per Rule 36.14(3), where a claimant makes a successful Part 36 offer, the court will, unless it considers it unjust to do so, order that the claimant is entitled to four enhanced benefits including "(b) his costs on the indemnity basis from the date on which the relevant period expired” and thus (as held) the “tension between rule 45.29B and rule 36.14A must, therefore, be resolved in favour of rule 36.14A”, the specific provision taking precedence over the general.    At paragraphs 30 and 31, the Court held that:    “...The starting point is that fixed costs and assessed costs are conceptually different. Fixed costs are awarded whether or not they were incurred, and whether or not they represent reasonable or proportionate compensation for the effort actually expended. On the other hand, assessed costs reflect the work actually done... ...Where a claimant makes a successful Part 36 offer in a section IIIA case, he will be awarded fixed costs to the last staging point provided by rule 45.29C and Table 6B. He will then be awarded costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis in addition from the date that the offer became effective. This does not require any apportionment. It will, however, lead to a generous outcome for the claimant. I do not regard this outcome as so surprising or so unfair to the defendant that it requires the court to equate fixed costs with costs assessed on the indemnity basis... a generous outcome in such circumstances is consistent with rule 36.14(3) as a whole and its policy of providing claimants with generous incentives to make offers, and defendants with countervailing incentives to accept them.” Whether this clarification will lead to an increase or decrease in litigation will remain to be seen. Certainly the current interpretation of this (formerly) knotty issue ought to remind all litigators, but particularly those acting for claimant parties, of the importance of early, well-pitched Part 36 Offers in both encouraging settlement and giving rise to another means of escaping the confines of the fixed costs regime.